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It is common that interest rate policy draws a great deal of attention.  
However, there has been few cases that triggered such an intense debate as 
did the high interest rate policy carried out by the IMF and the Korean 
government right after the outbreak of currency crisis in 1997.  This policy 
invited a tremendous degree of controversy among ordinary people as well 
as economists, both domestically and internationally.  The IMF argued that 
the high interest rate policy was inevitable in order to stabilize perilous 
currency market, while others argued that this policy only raised the 
bankruptcy risks of highly leveraged Korean firms and destabilized the 
currency market.  Since then, the interest rate has been lowered to a historic 
level, opening up the “super low interest rate era.”  Just as there was hot 
debate about whether the interest rate was too high right after the currency 
crisis, there is now debate on whether the current interest rate is too low. 
Motivated by these debates, Dr. Dongchul Cho attempts to assess the 
post-crisis interest rate policy.  More specifically, he raises two questions: 
(i) whether the high interest rate policy right after the outbreak of crisis was 
effective on exchange rate stabilization and (ii) whether the post-crisis 
interest rate policy can be justified in light of the optimal monetary policy 
rule framework.  In order to answer the first question, he presents a 
theoretical framework that explains how a temporarily high interest rate 
policy can stabilize the depreciating exchange rate through either signaling 
effect or unanticipated monetary shock.  As for empirical evidence, he 
summarizes the existing literature showing that the results are still 
inconclusive.  In order to answer the second question, he calibrates an 
optimal monetary policy model.  Using the result of this experiment, he 
argues that the high interest rate policy appears hard to be justified from the 
second quarter of 1998.  He also argues that the low interest rate policy since 
1999 can be justified only when GDP deflator as opposed to Core CPI was 
used, while leaving the question unanswered whether GDP deflator is a 
better measure of inflation than Core CPI. 
I hope this work by Dr. Cho can help scholars and policymakers to better 
understand the post-crisis interest rate policy, from which future monetary 
policymaking will eventually benefit.  Finally, Dr. Cho and I share the 
appreciation toward the Research Center for International Finance(RCIF) 
for their full support on this research. 
 
 
 Choong Soo Kim 
       President  
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This paper discusses Korea’s post-crisis monetary policy, focusing on 
two questions: (i) whether the high interest rate policy right after the 
outbreak of crisis was effective on exchange rate stabilization and (ii) 
whether the post-crisis interest rate policy can be justified in light of the 
optimal monetary policy rule framework.  In the first part, this paper 
presents a theoretical framework that explains how a temporarily high 
interest rate policy can stabilize the depreciating exchange rate through 
either signaling effect or unanticipated monetary shock.  As for empirical 
evidence, the paper summarizes the existing literature showing that the 
results are still inconclusive, but if there is any country in Asia where the 
policy was effective, it is likely to be Korea.  Then the paper discusses 
conjectures that can explain this result for Korea.   In the second part, this 
paper discusses monetary policy objectives and implied interest rate policy 
rules, and how to understand the post-crisis interest rate policy of Korea by 
comparing calibration results of such policy rules with the actual interest 
rate policy.  The high interest rate policy in 1998 can be justified only when 
the actual (year-on-year) inflation rates as opposed to expected inflation 
rates were used.  In contrast, the low interest rate policy since 1999 can be 
justified only when GDP deflator as opposed to Core CPI was used.  Then 
the paper criticizes the actual year-on-year inflation rate as an inflation index 
for the monetary policy, and argues that the high interest rate policy appears 













Korean history will probably record the last three years of the 20th 
century as a period of dramatic economic policy experiments.  Reforms 
affected virtually the entire economy, from financial and labor markets to 
the corporate and government sectors. 
Macroeconomic policy was no exception.  Immediately following the 
outbreak of the crisis, the fiscal authority decided to mobilize funds totaling 
more than 12 percent of GDP for purposes of financial sector restructuring.  
But this was nothing compared to the revolution in monetary policy.   
Before the crisis, the fluctuation of the currency was limited to a narrow 
range, and a variety of restrictions were maintained on capital inflows and 
outflows.  The crisis led to a complete change of face: the exchange rate was 
allowed to float freely, and the capital account was liberalized.  Inflation 
targeting was introduced as a legal mandate, and the intermediate target of 
monetary policy was shifted from the monetary aggregates such as M2 to 
short-term interest rates.1 
Perhaps the most dramatic and controversial aspect was interest rate 
policy.  In November and December 1997, when the currency crisis was 
triggered, stabilization of the exchange rate had been the foremost policy 
objective.  Overnight inter-bank call rates were raised to more than 30 
percent from the previous level of 12 to 13 percent in order to attract 
capital inflows and limit outflows.  Partly in response, the GDP growth 
rate plunged to –8 percent (year-on-year) in the second quarter of 1998, 
and the unemployment rate skyrocketed to over 8 percent, from less than 3 
percent before the crisis.  A large number of firms, unable to bear the now 
higher costs of servicing their debts, were plunged into bankruptcy, and 
the volume of non-performing loans in the financial sector rose explosively. 
Eventually, the foreign exchange market stabilized, and the call rate 
was lowered to 8 percent by the end of September 1998.  On September 30 
the Bank of Korea lowered the call rate target by 100 basis points, signaling 
that the goal of monetary policy had shifted from stabilizing the currency’s 
value to boosting the economy.  The call rate continued to be lowered until 
it hit historically low levels of 4 to 5 percent, inaugurating the era of 
“super-low interest rates.”  The path of interest rates is shown in Figure 1, 
                                                 
1. Detailed explanations about the evolution of monetary policy scheme in Korea after the 
crisis can be found in Cho (2002). 
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together with the won/dollar exchange rate, and along with the 
corresponding variables in Thailand and the Philippines. 
There has been no shortage of arguments criticizing and defending the 
interest rate policies adopted in response to the crisis.  The relevant 
literature is already very large.  Rather than surveying this terrain again, in 
this paper I focus on two issues that require further clarification and that 
would benefit from additional research.  These issues are whether the high 
interest rate policy was effective in stabilizing the exchange rate and 
whether post-crisis interest rate policy was too tight or too lose when 
judged from the vantage point of the literature on optimal interest rate 
rules.  If the high interest rate policy was ineffective or, rather, contributed 
to further depreciation of the exchange rate after the crisis, it was then a 
mistake.  But even if the policy helped to stabilize the exchange rate, it still 
does not sufficiently justify the high interest rate policy in terms of whether 
it was an efficient means of achieving the ultimate goal of monetary policy -- 












Interest rate policy was at the center of the crisis program designed by 
the International Monetary Fund and implemented by the Korean 
government.  The country’s agreement with the Fund essentially declared 
that the immediate goal was to stabilize the exchange rate (not inflation or 
the level of output) and that the interest rate would be raised substantially to 
achieve this end.2 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings  
 
Along with questions about whether this focus on stabilizing the 
exchange rate was justified as a way of restoring confidence in financial 
markets and stability to the Korean economy, given that the country had 
already taken some steps toward making its exchange rate more flexible in 
the years leading up to the crisis, the presumption that interest rate hikes 
were the appropriate device for achieving that goal was also challenged in 
the literature on the Asian crisis countries (see e.g., Furman and Stiglitz 
1998).  The conceptual framework laid out by Cho and West (2001) is helpful 
for addressing this question.  That framework starts with the uncovered 
interest parity condition, which can be written as: 
 
(1)  it = Etst+1 - st + dt. 
where it is (net) domestic interest rates; st is the log of the spot exchange rate 
                                                 
2. The Letter of Intent stated that "[m]oney market rates will be allowed to rise sufficiently 
and will be maintained at that level or higher as needed to stabilize the market"(1997.12.3); 
"Raise call rates to 30%, or above if needed, to stabilize the exchange rate" (1997.12.24); "Call 
rates have been at around 30% since Dec. 26 and will be kept high until the foreign exchange 
situation improves" (1998.1); "With the mitigation of the immediate foreign exchange crisis, call 
rates will be cautiously allowed to ease, in line with continued exchange rate stabilization" 
(1998.2); "Interest rate policy will continue to be conducted in a flexible and symmetric manner.  
Subject to the objective of maintaining stability in the foreign exchange market, call interest rates 
will continue to be lowered, in line with market conditions" (1998.5); "Interest rate policy will 
continue to be conducted in a flexible manner with upward and downward adjustments as 
necessary." (1998.7); "Easy monetary stance will be maintained .... " (1998.11). 
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(with higher values indicating depreciation); Et denotes expectations; and dt 
is a risk premium that incorporates the fluctuation of foreign interest rates.  
The orthodox relationship follows directly: if it is increased, but Etst+1 and dt 
are unchanged, then st must fall (the exchange rate must appreciate). 
This channel may be offset, however, insofar as increases in the interest 
rate are associated with increases in the risk premium.  That is, the effect of it 
on st depends on the indirect but endogenous movement of dt, which may be 
represented by: 
 
(2) dt = λit + ~udt, 
where d is a parameter and ~udt is a disturbance term.  The conventional view 
would be λ<0 or λ=0.  In an alternative view, such as that of Furman and 
Stiglitz (1998), λ>>0 (or substantially greater than zero), higher interest rates 
are associated with higher risk. 
It is important to note that while the monetary authority sent consistent 
signals that the high interest rate policy was temporary, it also indicated that 
the timing of its abandonment would depend on the movement of the 
exchange rate.  Since investors in the currency market were forward looking, 
they presumably incorporated this information into their expectations.  This 
idea can be captured by modeling it as endogenously determined through 
the policy reaction function: 
 
(3) it = aEt-1st + umt 
where a is a parameter and umt is a disturbance term.  The IMF’s preferences 
can be modeled by assuming a>0; in other words, the monetary authority 
leans against expected exchange rate depreciation. 
Equations (1)-(3) can be used to derive solutions for the three 
endogenous variables, it, st, and dt, under the stability assumption 
0<b≡[1+a(1-λ)]-1<1.  In order to make the implications more transparent, 
assume that both ~udt and ~umt follow AR(1) processes with the AR coefficients 
0<φd<1 and 0<φm<1, respectively: ~udt = φd ~udt-1+εdt and ~umt = φm ~umt-1+εmt, 
where εdt and εmt are innovations.  The Appendix uses these assumptions to 
derive explicit solutions for the effects of exogenous variables.  Figure 2 
summarizes those solutions intuitively. 
Suppose that there was a shock to the risk premium term, εdt, at time 0.  
(This can be thought of as capturing the impact of the crisis elsewhere in 
Asia on Korea.)  This unanticipated increase in risk causes the exchange rate 
to depreciate and the interest rate to rise (i.e., both it and st rise).  In Figure 2, 
this is represented by an upward shift of the interest rate-exchange rate 
frontier which connects the equilibrium values of st, and it (where the 
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parameter a is still to be determined).3  If it is assumed that the risk premium 
is persistent (that is, that φd>0) and that the system is stable 
(0<b≡[1+a(1-λ)]-1<1 ), then the frontier gradually shifts back to the origin 
following the shock.  One may justify this persistence by the fact that the 
restoration of market confidence or foreign reserves takes time. 
Given this frontier, a monetary authority for which the level of the 
exchange rate appears in the objective function can resort to two tools.  First, 
it can operate on investors’ expectations by announcing a monetary policy 
rule.  This can be captured by assuming an increase in the parameter a, and 
by the upward rotation of the diagonal line in Figure 2.  By announcing their 
policy rule, the monetary authority chooses a value of a, which pins down 
the economy’s position (in other words, it pins down a particular 
equilibrium pair of st and it along the interest rate-exchange rate frontier).  In 
the extreme case where a approaches infinity, we have the case of a 
currency board system as in Hong Kong.  At the other extreme, as a 
approaches zero, only st adjusts, while it is fixed.  By raising a, the case in 
question, the monetary authority declares that interest rate policy will 
henceforth more closely target fluctuations in the exchange rate.  If credible, 
this policy announcement can feed into the investors’ expectations about the 
future path of the interest rates, which will be stabilizing immediately.  This 
is the “signaling effect.” 
The monetary authority’s second tool is to adopt a policy stance that is 
even more contractionary than anticipated by the market.  This is 
represented by a positive value for εmt and by movement in Figure 2 along 
the interest rate-exchange rate frontier in a northeast direction.  As shown in 
the Appendix, a contractionary monetary shock (under the assumption of 
stability) causes the interest rate to rise and the exchange rate to appreciate; 
again, this is the orthodox effect.  By this interpretation, the collapse of 
Korea’s exchange rate was caused by an increase in the perceived level of 
risk, and the exchange rate would have collapsed still more dramatically 
than was actually the case had the monetary authority not pursued a policy 
even more contractionary than anticipated by the market. 
One important point to note from this discussion is that the goal of the 
high interest rate policy taken to stabilize the exchange rate was not just to 
surprise the market with an unusually tight monetary policy, but also to 
impress upon investors the intentions of the monetary authorities.  That is, 
the authorities sought to stabilize the exchange rate by exploiting what is 
referred to above as the signaling effect.  The repeated announcements of the 
Korean government and the IMF regarding the stance of monetary policy 
suggest that the policymakers were attempting to utilize this signaling 
channel. 
                                                 
3. This frontier, (1-λ) it + (1-φd) st = φdt εd0, is derived by eliminating a from the solutions for 
it and st, for εmt=0 for all t.  I call this line the interest rate - exchange rate frontier in the sense that 
the monetary authority cannot alter it. 
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Unfortunately, this analysis suggesting that high interest rate policy was 
indeed effective in stabilizing the exchange rate is contingent on the validity 
of the stability assumption – in other words, that 0<b≡[1+a(1-λ)]-1<1.  If the 
risk premium is sufficiently responsive to the interest rate (λ>1), then the 
model becomes unstable and the preceding logic breaks down.  In this case, 
the appropriate policy for stabilizing the exchange rate is to reduce interest 
rates (a<0).  This may be the case that Furman and Stiglitz (1998) had in 
mind – that higher interest rates so increased the cost of servicing the heavy 
debt loans of Korean banks and firms that investors began worrying about 
the possible bankruptcy of Korean enterprise, leading them to demand a 
higher risk premium for holding Korean assets.  This, then, is the heterodox 
result.  While the preceding model helps by identifying the issues and 
assumptions on which the controversy turns, that controversy can be 
resolved only by examining the data. 
 
 
2.2 Empirical Findings 
 
Table 1 summarizes empirical research on the impact of interest rates on 
the exchange rate in the context of the Asian crisis.  General conclusions are 
evidently difficult to draw.  Indeed, there may be good reasons why 
empirical work in this area is inconclusive.  First, the high interest rate 
policy was maintained for only a limited time, six months to a year 
depending on the country concerned.  Even if weekly data are available, this 
still provides only 25 to 50 observations and few degrees of freedom for 
empirical work.  Daily data provide more degrees of freedom but contain 
substantial amounts of noise.   
Second, there is the problem of identification (whether we observing the 
impact of monetary policy on the variable or variables of interest – the 
exchange rate, for example – or the effect of those other variables on 
monetary policy).  Although identification problems are pervasive in 
empirical macroeconomics, identification is likely to be particularly difficult 
in currency crisis periods, which feature large disturbances and structural 
shifts. 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence of the orthodox effect of high 
interest rates in Korea.  Park and Choi (1999), Dekle, Hsiao and Wang (1999), 
Tanner (1999), Barsurto and Ghosh (2000), and Cho and West (2000, 2001) all 
find evidence for the orthodox effect in the Korean data, although their 
findings for other Asian countries is more mixed.  As an experiment, Figure 
3 shows the impulse responses estimated from bivariate vector 
autoregressions (VARs) for the exchange rate and the interest rate, country 
by country.4  Bearing in mind all the reservations why VARs like these 
                                                 
4. Sample periods for the VARs were one year after the outbreak of the crises: 12/1/1997-
11/30/1998 for Korea and 7/1/1997-6/30/1998 for Thailand and the Philippines.  10 lagged 
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should be regarded cautiously, the left-hand figure for each country can be 
interpreted as showing the effect of an increase in the interest rate on the 
exchange rate.  These results suggest that Korea was the only country where 
interest rate hikes led to appreciation of the exchange rate. 
Why then was the result different in Korea?  There are several potential 
explanations.  The first of these is destructive: it is the possibility of 
misidentification.  Specifically, there is the danger of misattributing to 
monetary policy the effects of two important country-specific events that 
may have significantly affected the investors’ expectations in the currency 
market and thereby the exchange rate.  The first such event was the 
announcement by the U.S. government on 24 December 1997 that a second 
line of emergency loans from G-7 countries would be made available.  The 
second was the successful completion of the negotiation in February 1998 
between the Korean government and foreign creditors for converting more 
than $20 billion in short-term debt into long-term debt.  These two events 
occurred soon after the interest rate was raised, complicating efforts to 
isolate the effect of the high interest rate policy. 
A second possible explanation for the contrast with other countries is 
that the high interest rate policy was more credible in Korea.  In comparison 
with Thailand and the Philippines, the interest rate in Korea moved far more 
closely with the exchange rate (Figure 1).  The simple correlation between 
the two variables is 0.300 for Korea but only 0.064 for Thailand and –0.135 
for the Philippines.  The impulse responses estimated in Figure 3 show that 
the interest rate rose (or, more precisely, was raised by the monetary 
authority) in response to the increase in the shock to the risk premium only 
in Korea.  The variance decompositions in Figure 4 also suggest that the 
interest rate was largely determined by the exchange rate shock in Korea, 
while it was determined independently in the other countries.  That is, the 
announcement by the government and the IMF that interest rates would be 
raised and kept at higher levels for as long as needed to stabilize the 
exchange rate appears to have been more credible in Korea, at least ex post.  
Investors may have come to believe that the Korean monetary authority was 
very serious about achieving its goal of exchange rate stabilization while 
continuing to regard skeptically the policy announcements of other 
countries.5 
Although this evidence is less than definitive, it is also true that many 
arguments critical of the high interest rate policy are equally or perhaps 
                                                                                                                
variables, or approximately 2 weeks, were included in the VAR, and the exchange rate was put 
first in the Cholesky decomposition.  Differenced data were used in estimation, but the impulse 
responses were calculated for the levels.  Dotted lines indicate 95% confidence bands in each 
graph. 
5. The legal introduction of inflation targeting in 1998 might have served to raise Korea’s 
monetary policy credibility, but this does not seem to be the major factor behind the success in 
exchange rate stabilization.  Inflation targeting had not yet become standard practice in 1998, 
and many international investors were worried about the possibility of deflation rather than 
inflation. 
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even more questionable.  For example, there is criticism that high interest 
rates actually aggravated the problem of capital outflows in December 1997, 
but this criticism overlooks the fact that an even larger capital outflow 
(reflecting the actions of domestic as well as foreign investors) might have 
resulted had interest rates not been raised.   In this regard, it may be 
noteworthy that, while foreign banks drastically reduced their exposures to 
Korea in December 1997, a substantial amount of foreign currency flowed 
into Korea seeking high interest rates.  For example, net private transfers, 
which had been slightly negative until October 1997, increased sharply to 
approximately 2 percent of monthly GDP in December 1997, and then 


























If the high interest rate policy was ineffective or, rather, contributed to 
further depreciation of the exchange rate after the crisis, it was then a 
mistake.  But even if the policy helped to stabilize the exchange rate, as 
suggested by the preceding evidence, it still does not follow that the policy 
was optimal.  In other words, the question is whether stabilization of the 
exchange rate should have been the intermediate target of policy – that is, 
whether it was an efficient means of achieving the ultimate goals of concern 
to the authorities. 
 
 
3.1 Policy Objectives and the Optimal Policy Rule 
 
The standard way of modeling optimal policy is to assume that the 
monetary authority minimizes a loss function of the form: 
 
(4) Min. (1-α)(π-π*)2+α(y-y*)2, 
where π and y are the inflation rate and the level of output, respectively, * denotes 
the target levels of these variables, and  α is a parameter that reflects the preferences 
of the authorities (the relative weights they attach to these targets).  The standard 
assumption, then, is that stable output and low inflation are the ultimate goals of 
policy.  Strictly speaking, a central bank with a legal mandate to target inflation, like 
the Bank of Korea after the crisis, should set α=0.6  In practice, however, most 
countries expect the monetary authority to be concerned with the stabilization of 
business cycles within an “acceptable” range of inflation; that is, the monetary 
authority is expected to set α such that 0<α<1, since economic activity would 
experience severe fluctuations otherwise.  Thus, while the Bank of Korea announced 
a medium-term inflation target of 2.5 percent in 1999, annual inflation  
                                                 
6. The new Bank of Korea Act (passed by the National Assembly in December 1997 and 
that took effect on April 1, 1988) declares that the primary goal of monetary policy is price 
stability instead of multiple, obscure objectives such as the soundness of the banking system and 
economic growth.  Since 1999, the Bank of Korea has announced the next year’s inflation target 
at the end of every year, and the Board of Governors convenes every month to set up the policy 
directions (mostly the level of call rate as the operating target) in accordance with the 
announced inflation target. 
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was allowed to deviate from that target by ±1 percent. 
One implication of this formulation is that exchange rate stabilization, in and of 
itself, is not the ultimate goal of economic policy.  For a small, open economy like 
Korea, Ball (1999) shows that the optimal monetary policy rule relates a linear 
combination of the interest rate and exchange rate (what is referred to in the 
literature as the Monetary Conditions Index, or MCI) to the two gaps in the 
preceding objective function: 7 
 
(5) MCI ≡ w(r–r*)– (1–w)(e–e*) = β’(π–π*) + γ’(y–y*), 
where r  and e  are the real interest rate and log of the real exchange rate, 
respectively, and w, β’ and γ’ are the parameters that depend on the 
underlying economic structures and the policymaker’s preferences. 8  
Ignoring the distinction between control and state variables and the 
distinction between expected and actual inflation, rearranging this equation 
yields an expression for the nominal interest rate, i ≡ r + π; 
 
(6) i = (π + r*) + β (π-π*) + γ (y-y*) + δ (e–e*), 
where the parameters β, γ, and δ are appropriately transformed from 
equation (5).9 
According to Equation (6), the interest rate should be raised, even if there 
has been no change in current levels of inflation and output, in response to 
depreciation of the currency.  Currency depreciation boosts aggregate 
demand, which implies both faster inflation and higher levels of output in 
the future.  Optimal policy today will respond to this information about 
economic conditions tomorrow – information conveyed by the exchange 
rate – even though the level of the exchange rate itself is not a policy 
objective.  Ignoring the distinction between nominal and real variables, 
which is sensible for the very short-term, Equation (3) in the previous 
chapter can be interpreted as a special case of Equation (6), where a=δ and 
umt comprise the remaining inflation and output gap terms.  Intuitively, the 
interest rate policy in response to the crisis had to be tied to the fluctuation 
of the exchange rate fluctuation because the latter was the dominating factor 
                                                 
7. See Ball (1999) for details.  Basically, he sets up a simple macroeconomic model that is 
composed of an open economy IS curve, an open economy Phillips curve, and interest parity 
condition.  Under this set-up of the model economy, one can show that the optimal policy rule 
can be stated as a linear combination of the two state variables, π and y. 
8. In fact, Ball (1999) proposes a policy rule that considers the short-term effect of the lagged 
exchange rate, but I did not include this effect for two reasons.  First, this rule appears to be 
sensitive to an ad hoc specification about economic structures.  Second, I applied this part in the 
calibration exercises, but the results did not change much. 
9. Strictly speaking, Equation (6) is not a formula describing the optimal interest rate rule in 
the sense that the right hand side includes an endogenous variable, e: when i changes, e changes 
too. 
12                                                                            Monetary Policy During and After the Crisis in Korea 
 
 





Even if there is some theoretical justification for using high interest rates 
to defend the exchange rate following the shock of the crisis, there remains 
the question of whether the authorities’ response was too much or too little.  
Were the interest rate responses optimal, in other words?  Or were there 
alternative interest rate paths that would have resulted in a lower social loss, 
as measured by equation 4?   
One way of addressing this question is by calibrating the optimal interest 
rate rule of equation 6.  Doing so is useful not just for assessing the high 
interest rate policy adopted in response to the crisis but also for analyzing 
the “super-low” interest rate environment established once confidence had 
been restored.  (Compared with pre-crisis levels of around 12 percent, call 
rates were reduced to approximately four percent, depths that had not been 
experienced in Korea since the 1960s.) 
I imposed a value of five percent for r*, reflecting the commonly cited 
potential growth rate of Korea after the crisis, and 2.5 percent for π*, the 
medium-term target declared by the Bank of Korea in 1999.  As for π, there 
are important issues.  The first issue is which inflation indicator should be 
used.  An obvious candidate is Core CPI, the official inflation target variable 
used by the Bank of Korea since 1999, which excludes irregular elements 
such as the prices of agricultural products and petroleum.  However, a GDP 
deflator that covers a wider range of prices than the CPI or Core CPI better 
represents aggregate economic conditions.  After the crisis, in particular, 
there were significant discrepancies between the Core CPI and GDP deflator 
due to the deterioration of the terms of trade (as shown in Figures 5A and 
Figure 5B).  In 1999, for example, the Core CPI inflation rate was more than 
two percent, while the GDP Deflator inflation rate was negative.  Therefore, 
I used both indexes in the following calibration. 
A second issue is whether to use data on ex ante expected inflation or ex 
post actual inflation.  Expected inflation is conceptually preferable 
(particularly when calibrating the real interest rate), but it must be estimated.  
And, in practice results are likely to differ substantially depending upon the 
techniques used in estimation.  I therefore used the ex post (year-on-year) 
inflation rate in the benchmark case and an estimate of expected inflation for 
comparison.   
For the Core CPI and GDP deflator, respectively, Figures 4A and 4B 
compare the actual with expected inflation rates.10  According to Figure 5A, 
expectations of inflation (in terms of the Core CPI) had turned negative by 
                                                 
10. Since the data frequency is quarterly, the expected annual inflation rate needs forecast 
values of up to four quarters ahead. 
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the end of 1998, before gradually returning to 2 to 4 percent rates of 
expected inflation thereafter.  Another feature of this figure is that expected 
inflation leads actual inflation, especially in the post-crisis period.   
An even more dramatic contrast between the actual and expected 
inflation rates is in Figure 5B.  While the actual inflation rate (in terms of the 
GDP deflator) exceeded 10 percent in the first quarter of 1998, expected 
inflation remained at zero, according to these estimates.  Expected inflation 
is far smoother than the actual inflation and remains continually below the 
target level of 2.5 percent. 
It is common in the literature to calibrate y−y* as the deviation of actual 
output from the hypothetical level that would have obtained in the absence 
of demand-side shocks.  In order to obtain this output gap, I applied the 
structural vector autoregression (SVAR) methodology of Blanchard and 
Quah (1989), using seasonally adjusted real GDP and price index (Core CPI 
or GDP deflator) data from 1980:I to 2002:I, and eight lags of the respective 
variables.11  Figure 5C shows the estimated output gap series, the GDP 
component that is driven by the demand shock alone, along with the peaks 
and troughs officially defined by the Statistics Bureau of Korea.  According 
to these estimates, the output gap plunged to historically unprecedented 
depths in 1998, but recovered to approximately zero by 2000.  After the crisis, 
the output gap estimated using the GDP deflator appears to be lower than 
that estimated using Core CPI, reflecting differences in the behavior of the 
two price indexes. 
For e–e*, I constructed a simple real effective exchange rate (or REER) 
index based on two currencies, the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen, with 
equal weights of  0.5.12  Figure 5D plots this REER series in percent changes 
from the base year of 2001.  According to this series, the exchange rate in the 
first quarter of 1998 was approximately 30 percent undervalued. 
With these variables in hand, the parameters β, γ and δ still need to be 
calibrated.  Although this calibration should in principle be based on 
estimates of the relevant parameters derived from the Korean data, this 
paper simply borrows values from Ball (1999).  For both β and γ, Ball 
assumes a range from 0.5 to 2.0.  (The value of β becomes smaller as the 
weight on the inflation fluctuation in the loss function becomes smaller.)  
For δ, Ball, Freedman (1994) and Gerlach and Smets (2000) all recommend a 
value of 0.3, although estimation results in Cho (2002) suggest that a value of 
0.1 is more plausible in the Korean case. 
                                                 
11. As for the application of the Blanchard and Quah (1989) methodology to the Korean 
data, Kim (1996) already reported detailed estimation results.  The most critical identification 
assumption of this technique is that the demand shock does not change the output level in the 
long-run, while the supply shock does.  The only deviation of this paper’s estimation from Kim 
(1996) is that I used the core CPI instead of the GDP deflator. 
12. Cho (2002) shows that this simple index is similar to a far more complex index based on 
16 trading partners’ currencies using the relative portions of trading volumes as the respective 
currencies’ weights. 
14                                                                            Monetary Policy During and After the Crisis in Korea 
 
 
3.3 Results and Discussion 
 
Figure 6A shows calibration results using actual inflation rates and 
β=γ=δ=0, along with the actual call rate (measured as a quarterly average).  
When the Core CPI is used to measure inflation outcomes, actual interest 
rates appear to have been too high in the first two quarters of 1998 but too 
low in 2000 and 2001.  When the GDP deflator is used, in contrast, call rates 
appear to be too high throughout all four quarters of 1998, before falling to 
roughly appropriate levels in 2000 and 2001.  That is, the “super-low interest 
rates” since 1999 do not appear to be too low if the GDP deflator accurately 
captures inflationary conditions.   
However, call rates immediately following the outbreak of the crisis are 
too high no matter which price index is used.  This finding is placed in relief 
in Figure 6B, where expected inflation (estimated from a VAR) is used in 
place of actual inflation.  Here optimal interest rates do not exceed ten 
percent even in 1998, which contrasts with the 30 per cent rates actually 
observed.   
In contrast, Figures 6C, 6E, and 6F show that the high interest rate policy 
in the first half of 1998 may have been justified, had the authority actively 
tried to stabilize the inflation or exchange rates and judge the inflation 
conditions by the actual GDP deflator.  In these cases, however, the optimal 
interest rate falls below zero in the first quarter of 1999, which raises doubts 
about this policy response. 
In short, the key assumption on which assessments of post-crisis interest 
rate policy appears to turn to which index of inflation is the appropriate 
guide to policy outcomes, rather than the particular parameter values that 
are assigned.  The question, in other words, is whether Korean policy 
makers should care about core CPI inflation or the GDP deflator and 
whether they can formulate reliable estimates of expected inflation.  Using 
expected inflation rates, no reasonable combination of parameter values can 
justify an interest rate as high as 15 percent in the first half of 1998.  The 
crucial issue when judging the low interest rate policy put in place in 1999 is 
whether the Core CPI or GDP deflator should be used.  Using Core CPI, it is 
again the case that no combination of reasonable parameter values can 
justify the authorities’ decision to cut interest rates to less than five percent 
after 2000. 
The question of which index of inflation is more relevant and reliable is 
not easily answered.  However, the actual year-on-year inflation rate used in 
calibration has a clear shortcoming, despite the fact that the year-on-year 
changes are commonly used in Korea to calculate baseline inflation rates.  
For example, while the level of the GDP deflator rose substantially in the 
first quarter of 1998, it then declined significantly in the second quarter.  
These wide fluctuations quarter to quarter will not be picked up by the year-
on-year inflation rate.  Although the volatility of annualized quarter-to-
quarter inflation rates (actual, not expected) obtained using the calibrated 
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model raise questions of reliability, taken at face value, they can justify the 
high level of interest rates actually observed only in the first quarter of 1998, 
not thereafter (and recall that interest rates were maintained at high through 
1998-Q2 and only gradually reduced in the second half of the calendar year). 
Of course, data on current macroeconomic conditions becomes available 
only with a lag, and monetary policy must be formulated on the basis of 
uncertain forecasts.  In practice, however, it is hard to invoke uncertainty as 
a justification for the maintenance of high interest rates beyond the first 
quarter of 1998.  Few if any macroeconomic indicators signaled the danger 
of accelerating future inflation after March; if anything, most variables 
pointed to the danger of deflation.  The exchange rate, which was the 
leading indicator of short-term price movements during the crisis, began 
stabilizing in February 1998.  Nominal wages, which may be a more 
informative guide of medium-term inflationary pressures, actually fell in 
1998 relative to the preceding calendar year.  In short, it is hard to justify the 
maintenance of the high interest rate policy after the first quarter of 1998, 
unless one sticks to a possibly deficient indicator like the year-on-year 
inflation rate. 
It is always very difficult to determine an appropriate monetary policy, 
not just ex ante but also ex post.  But, in the Korean case, evidence suggests 
that had the authorities begun lowering interest rates earlier, they would not 
have been forced to shift monetary policy so dramatically in October 1998.  
Had they starting reducing interest rates earlier and more gradually, they 
might have helped to avoid a deflationary recession in 1998 and a bubble-
like recovery in 1999.  They would have avoided what turned out to be the 














This paper has discussed Korea’s post-crisis monetary policy, focusing 
on whether the high interest rate policy adopted immediately after the 
outbreak of the crisis was effective in stabilizing the exchange rate and 
whether post-crisis interest rate policy can be justified in light of the 
literature on optimal monetary policy.   While it is impossible to determine 
conclusively whether tight money was effective in stabilizing the exchange 
rate, if there is any country in Asia for which the policy worked, that 
country was Korea.  As for whether post-crisis monetary policy was too 
tight, too loose, or just about right, the answer hinges on which index of 
inflation is appropriate for such calculations.  The high interest rate policy 
maintained in the first quarter of 1998 can be justified if the actual (year-on-
year) inflation rate as opposed to the expected inflation rate (estimated from 
vector autoregressions) is used.  The low interest rate policy in place since 
1999 can be justified if the GDP deflator rather than the Core CPI is used.  
But whatever uncertainty remains about the advisability of raising interest 
rates to observed heights in the first quarter of 1998, analysis suggests that 
the authorities should have started moving in this direction at an earlier date.  
In fact, there appears to be latitude for interest rate reductions starting in the 
second quarter of 1998. 
This paper has also revealed that many important issues related to the 
conduct of monetary policy in Korea remain unresolved.  This paper will 






Appendix: Solutions of the Model in Section 2 
 
 
The reduced-form solutions to the system in the text are: 
 
Et-1 st = b ∑j { bj Et-1[udt+j–(1-d)umt+j] } , 
 it = a Et-1 st + umt , 
st = [ -(1-d) it  + Et st+1 + udt ]. 
 
An unanticipated risk shock: With respect to a unit shock to εdt at time 0, 
both the   interest rate and the exchange rate both jump initially (s0 and i1), 
but both variables decline smoothly thereafter. 
 
 i0 = 0 , 
 s0 = 1/(1-bφd) > 0, 
 d0 = 1   > 0 , 
 
 it = a st > 0,    for t>0 , 
 st = φdt  b/(1-bφd)  > 0 ,  for t>0 , 
 dt = φmt adb/{(1-bφd)+1} > 0, for t>0. 
 
An unanticipated monetary shock: With respect to a unit shock to εmt at time 
0, the interest rate rises and the exchange rate appreciates initially, after 
which both gradually approach zero over time. 
 
 i0 = 1 > 0 , 
 s0 = -{(1-d)/(1-bφm)} < 0 , 
 d0 = d > 0, 
 
 it = φmt b (1-φm)/(1-bφm) > 0,   for t>0 , 
 st = -φmt b (1-d)/(1-bφm) < 0 ,  for t>0 , 
 dt = φm
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<Table 1> Summary of Previous Empirical Research 
 




Various data including 
daily time-series data 
Five Asian crisis countries 
(1997-1998): Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand 
Five other crisis countries:  
Mexico (1982), Chile (1982), 
Sweden (1992), UK (1992), 
Mexico (1994)  
Estimation of real 
exchange rates, 
real interest 
rates, and the 
real interest 
parity relation 
The evidence is mixed, 
but on balance favors 
the view that the 
higher interest rates were 
associated with 
appreciations in crisis-












change rates as 
control variables 
High interest rates 
appear to cause ex-
change rate apprecia-






Weekly Time-series data 
(1997-1998) 
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand 
VAR 
Interest rate hikes led 
to exchange rate appre-
ciation, though with 





Cross-country data for the 
countries that have undergone 
currency crises during the 




tive measures  
Dramatic increases in 
interest rates have been 
associated with cur-
rency appreciation.  
But there was no clear 
association for a sub-
sample of countries that 
have undergone a 
banking crisis along 
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<Table 1> continue 
 
Authors Data Methodology Conclusion 
Tanner 
(1999) 
Monthly time-series data 
(1990:1-1998:12) 
Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, 






















Weekly time-series data 
Five crisis-hit Asian 
countries(1997-1998): 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand 
Use measures of 
international credit 
spreads and of 
domestic stock 
prices as proxies 
for investor con-
cerns about credit-  
worthiness and 
country risk. 
Unable to find a 
reliable relationship 
between interest rates 










Although the major 
driving force of the 
exchange rate stabili-
zation seems to be the 
recovery of the foreign 
currency liquidity 
position, the high 
interest rate appears to 
have contributed to 
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<Table 1> continue 
 





Monthly time-series data 
(1990:1-1998:12) 
Indonesia, Korea, Thailand 
Identify the risk 
premium by the 
difference be-
tween the actual 
exchange rate and 
the (pure mone-
tary model based) 
theoretical ex-
change rate, and 
relate thus de-
fined risk pre-




policy was associated 
with an appreciation 
of the exchange rate, 
and there is little 
evidence of higher 
interest rates contri-
buting to a widening 




Data for speculative attack 
periods in a sample of 75 
developed and developing 
countries over the period 
1960-1997. 
Examine the be-





There is no systematic 
association between 














of the model 








cate that exogenous 
increases in interest 
rates led to exchange 
rate appreciation in 
Korea and the 
Philippines, depre-
ciation in Thailand, 
but the confidence 








<Figure 1> Exchange Rate and Call Rate Korea  
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<Figure 5> Variables for Calibration 
 
A. Actual vs. Expected Inflation (Core CPI) 
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D. Real Effective Exchange Rate (Won vs. Dollar and Yen) 
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<Figure 6> Calibration Results 
 
A. Actual Inflation, β=0, γ=0, δ=0 
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B. Expected Inflation, β=0, γ=0, δ=0 
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C. Actual Inflation, β=1, γ=0, δ=0 
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D. Actual Inflation, β=0, γ=1, δ=0 
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